Patton was most certainly the most brilliant of the allied generals, with a better understanding of how to win the war than even Ike or Monty. Patton was without a doubt the most experienced and knowledgeable general of modern armor and infantry tactics at the time, with prior experience in battle in Sicily and North Africa when the time came to plan Operation Overlord, and yet he was passed over, mostly for political reasons, such as his expressed worry over the Soviet alliance and the slapping incidents.
The Sicily campaign, which Bradley sited as proof of Patton's incompetence, was in fact anything but, as even Ike said:
He has conducted a campaign where the brilliant successes scored must be attributed directly to his energy, determination, and unflagging aggressiveness. The operations of the Seventh Army in Sicily are going to be classed as a model of swift conquest by future class in the War College in Leavenworth. The prodigious marches, the incessant attacks, the refusal to be halted by appalling difficulties in communications and terrain, are really something to enthuse about.
Patton's Third Army achieved incredible things when it was allowed to, which wasn't often, and it is really remarkable it achieved what it did with Patton wearing several leashes and being halted numerous times when advance would have crushed the enemy. As it was, the Third Army killed over 144,500 of the enemy, which was 5 times more dead than it had suffered, and in total casualties caused the enemy ten times the casualties it suffered, not to mention 81,522 square miles of land conquered and over 12,000 cities and towns liberated. Over the nine-month course of action of the third army, it took on average 2,724 Germans per day.
Patton was forced to halt his rapid advance into Germany, causing him to complain to Bradley: "Damn it Brad, just give me 400,000 gallons of gasoline and I'll put you inside Germany in two days." This is probably truer than Patton is given credit for. As Victor Davis Hanson Notes: "A final drive over the Rhine would create such terror among the remnants of the defeated armies that Hitler's resistance would cease. The dreaded West Wall . . . that constituted Germany's last line of defense at the end of August was essentially undefended, the doors to the pillboxes rusted, the keys lost."* Even more telling is this statement by the German chief of Staff in the West: "There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open." There never should have been a battle of the bulge.
"The reason for Patton's halt was explained away as 'lack of supplies'. Another great lie. There was no lack of supplies. There was, however, a 'diversion of supplies'." (18)** This was due to many things, including John C.H. Lee, who used innumerable supplies for his own lavish relocation to Paris. Of course, Patton's supplies were also diverted to Monty for his Market Garden operation, which turned into a complete disaster--Allied forces suffered more casualties than in the invasion of Normandy. Monty had gotten everything he could have hoped for: Patton halted, priority in supplies and weapons, and over 30,000 troops. It did not reflect well on the high command, and it is obvious that Ike's appeasement of anything the British wanted had caused a great waste of lives and supplies. As Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands said: "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success." After all, the reason Monty was given what he had asked for was simple. In Patton's words: "Bedell Smith . . . says that the reason everyone yields to Monty is because Monty is the National Hero and writes directly to the Prime Minister; and that if Ike crossed him, Ike would get canned." So much for the coalition. This brings up another point, which is that Ike held the coalition together in one way: whenever a dispute arose between the British and the Americans, the British always won. Even Bradley came to realize this. As Patton recalled, Ike had said to him: "George, you are my oldest friend in the world, but if you or anyone else criticizes the British, by God, I will reduce him to his permanent grade and send him home."
The real folly of halting Patton is the simple fact that allowing your enemies time to regroup, especially after they are beaten and broken, is one of the most fundamental follies of warfare. Be that as it may, this is exactly what the high command did. By stopping Patton, they did not finish the job. The broken and demoralized German armies were given a breather, and they took advantage of it. Instead of terror-stricken and broken troops, the Germans regrouped and attacked. In war, morale is everything. A broken army cannot resist, regardless of numbers or equipment. Patton's drive annihilated the German morale, and would have won the war many months and thousands of lives sooner. "With German forces in total disarray at the end of August, a virtually undefended Lorraine beckoned like the Rhine sirens of mythology." (330-by D'Este) In the Lorraine region, Patton simply ran out of gas and sputtered to a hault. The Germans took advantage of the sudden and unforseen respite from Patton's attacks to offer a stubborn defense at Metz. It brought back the static warfare reminisinet of the early campaign, of which kind the Germans desired to make a return to. What once would have been possible in a few days took 16 weeks, as the German army was reinvented on the western front. The weather turned bad, the days shortened, thus shortening flying time for support aircraft, and the roads were soon muddy and booby-trapped. Consider the statements of General Westfall, new chief of staff to von Rundstedt:
"The overall situation in the West was serious in the extreme. A heavy defeat anywhere along the front, which was so full of gaps that it did deserve the name, might lead to a catastrophe, if the enemy were to exploit his opportunity skillfully. A particular source of danger was that not a single bridge over the Rhine had been prepared for demolition, an omission which it took weeks to repair. . . . Until the middle of October the enemy could have broken through at any point he liked with ease, and would then have been able to cross the Rhine and thrust deep into Germany almost unhindered." (335)
Also,
I would like to state unequivocally that we would have been totally incapable of putting up any serious resistance and foiling a drive across the western boundaries of the Reich had General Eisenhower decided upon a truly determined, concentrated and ruthless advance at this point. At that time, headquarters of OB West was located in the vicinity of Koblenz. Whenever after sunset we could hear the rattling of chains in the street where the Field Marshal had his quarters, he would ask, "Can this be Patton?" The question was posed in jest, of course, but it did not lack the most serious undertone. (451n57)
Even Bradley, no friend of Patton's, came to a similar conclusion: "Three months and many casualties later we were to be forcefully reminded that in war, opportunity once forsaken is opportunity lost forever." (452n63)
Many historians have come to see the folly of halting Patton.
As British military observer Ian Hogg said: "There can be little doubt that Eisenhower's decision was wrong in every particular, and if Patton had been given his supplies, and his head, there is every likelihood that the war could have been shortened by six months. It is a matter of record that two-thirds of all the Allied casualties in Europe were suffered after the September check." (333)
Patton favored outflanking and racing through the enemy heartland. The gradual head-on push which was the initial plan would cost too many men's lives. There was no need to slowly inch forward, arriving in Germany in 1946 after a series of brutal head-on confrontations. Rather, the best course was to seek an opening, and drive thousands of armored troops through it on a narrow front, into the heart of Germany.
The most common argument against this is that Patton's army would be swallowed up by the Germans and that there was no real point in him driving into the heart of Germany. This assumes that Patton is not destroying enemy resistance. In fact, the opposite is true. Such an advance destroys the morale of an army, and sets off a chain reaction of defeat. Patton racing through the German lines absolutely destroyed the enemy's morale, and set off a chain reaction of defeat. Carving up the enemy homeland was a catastrophic morale buster for the Germans. And Patton attacked on a narrow front and lightning fast, making encirclement of him less likely than the eventual collapse of the German army. The same arguments were put to Sherman when he was proposing his march during the Civil War. He would be swallowed up, cut off, the resistance would be stiff, etc. Sherman is in all probability the general who won the Civil War.
Patton's successes were not simply mopping up a beaten army, either. Despite the feelings of some, the Western front was in no way lesser or subsidiary to the Eastern front. On the western front, the Americans destroyed a veteran army--just because they were able to do it with fewer casualties and much quicker does not make it any less important. It makes it more impressive. The Russians killed millions, but also lost millions. The Americans lost thousands, and had millions simply surrender. Making things more impressive is the fact that the American army in the west was fighting on many more fronts and much further from supplies, all the while more effectively than the Russians, who were fighting on a linear front and with supplies in their immediate rear.
German potential had hardly been tapped, and in June 1944 there were some 850,000 Germans in the West alone, and there were more Germany infantry divisions available to defend the normandy beaches than the initial Allied invasion force. In August 1944, the Germans were adding 300,000 new troops, and in September and October 200,000. At the time of the Allies greatest successes in August 1944, there were roughly 800,000 Germans facing the same number of Americans. In the north, perhaps even more were pitted against 600,000 allied troops. In November 1944, German munitions production was at all time highs. Considering that it usually took the Russians an advantage of anywhere from 5 to 15 to 1, the Germans had every reason to believe they could halt the Allied advance.
The fall of 1944 saw the German and Allied forces as roughly equal, and as the German Ardennes offensive wore down, there were still 70 German divisions to 73 Allied.
[Patton] raced through Normandy, charged to Bastogne, and dashed across the Rhine not because the German army was either intrinsically weak or dispirited, but rather because his mobility and tactics left them troubled as to where he was going and what he intended. That he travelled faster, farther, inflicted more casualties, and suffered less harm than other Allied armies bears out this assertion--he certainly had no more advantages than the French army had in 1940, the British army in Egypt, the American army in Italy, or his own associates in Normandy. (328)*
As Roger Nye said, "The Patton mind that emerged from this crucible of private study was capable of creating a kind of warfare that was so fast and so destructive of the the enemy that the battle could be won with a minimum of friendly casualties and expenditure of materiel."
Nor was that the only time when halting Patton was a disastrous move. The Falaise Gap was a perfect example of general incompetence by the Allied command, where at least 50,000 Germans escaped to fight and kill GI's at a later date. 175,000 to 200,000 surrounded German troops were given another week to escape when Patton was ordered to stop. Here, the main reason for stopping Patton was political. Monty demanded that he be allowed to close the gap and get the glory for Patton's brilliant leadership. Of course, as Patton predicted, the British were unable to close the gap in time and thousands of Germans escaped. The reasons given publicly for what was perhaps the biggest blunder of the war of course could not relate this. First, it was claimed that the British had sown the area with time bombs, and secondly, Bradley claimed he feared a head on collision with the British and that Third Army would be trampled by the fleeing Germans. The first claim is, of course, purely fiction. The second is is nonsensical. Had proper orders been issued, for the British to hold their position, there would be no possibility of a collision. Bradley's other concern is almost a mockery to military history. A routed enemy would not be able to trample two infantry and an armored division. Surrender would be the most likely outcome.
Another thing I find remarkable in Patton's achievements is the fact that he had covered 260-plus phase days of territory in only 19 days. (phase days are the expected positions at any given day, i.e. D + 50) "In the nearly two months of warring under Bradley and Montgomery, the Allies had advanced not more than twenty miles from the beaches. By the end of the first thirty days of the Third Army's deployment, the Americans were nearly four hundred miles away from the French Coast, approaching Verdun and barreling forward less than a hundred miles from Germany itself."*
When the German counter-offensive came in 1944, the Allied high command was caught off-guard. All except Patton, that is, who nearly three weeks before had noted: "First Army is making a terrible mistake in leaving the VIII Corps static, it is highly probable that the Germans are building up east of them." Oscar Koch, PattonÕs intelligence officer, had sensed rail movements and a buildup of forces, so that even before the Germans attacked, Patton ordered his staff to draw up plans for a northward march in case of a German assault in the Ardennes. Patton was ordered and prepared to do in a few days what had taken months for the Germans to accomplish: the transfer of entire armies from their own sector to another. Ike even later claimed that PattonÕs incredible shift was proof of the Allied flexibility, though it was more evidence of what Patton could do if allowed.
Patton had a remarkable sixth sense in combat. He proved time and again that he could see what actions the enemy would take. This is an exceptional quality in a commander, and some of the greatest commanders of all time have been marked by such an ability, for instance Alexander. It is an absolutely invaluable ability. Some examples of this "sixth sense" include the following:
In North Africa, the Allies were planning to attack the Germans on the 25 December at Tunisia. Patton regarded this as unwise, and that there were not enough forces at the front. Eisenhower was eventually forced to admit that it was a mistake and to call of the attack because of rains, congested railroads, insufficient trucks.
Patton was shown the plans for the invasion of Salerno, Italy, and he pointed out a flaw. He said that the Sele River, which served as a boundary between the British and American forces, but actually had no forces on or near it, would be the place where the Germans would strike. Artillery was supposed to be ashore, but as Patton had said, plans rarely work out in war. In the event, the Germans did exactly what he had said, and it nearly split the Allied army in two.
When the Italian armistice was declared, Patton feared that telling the troops would put their guard down, and resistance to the landing at Salerno would have a very bad effect. The troops were informed of the armistice, and immediately assumed there would be no resistance. The soldiers ignored reports of Germans on the beaches, and needless lives ending up being lost.
Concerning the Anzio landings, Patton had grave doubts: "[The operation] is pretty dubious as the beaches are bad and largely unknown . . . It seems inconceivable that the Germans will not guess that we are coming ashore at Anzio . . ." Of course, this came to pass.
While Patton was without doubt a superb field commander, he was also much more, capable of the highest strategic thinking. Other than operation Torch, he was never officially consulted in planning of operations. In private, however, Bradley heavily relied on his advise. He would "borrow" Patton's thoughts, which would later turn up as Bradley's ideas. This became so frequent that Patton got quite fed up with it: "I do not want any more of my ideas used without credit to me, as happens when I give them orally." Other officers were advancing up the ladder and building their careers off of Patton, while Patton himself remained under wraps with those of lesser ability being promoted over him. Patton's aide, Charles Codman, wrote to his wife: "As of August 1st, General Bradley has adopted practically all of General Patton's plans." Patton was the best planner of them all in Europe, and his knowledge of strategy and tactics unparalleled. "Without exception, his intuitiveness and perceptiveness was never equalled by any of the "masterminds" at SHAEF." (20)**
For some reason or another, Patton was continually overlooked and had credit taken away. At Bastogne, Hodges and Bradley both received a Distinguished Service medal, despite the fact that their poor leadership was also one of the chief causes of the crisis in the town. Patton did not receive a thing for his and third army's monumental part in the relief of the town.
Eisenhower's actions with regard to Patton were almost always political in nature. Market Garden is a perfect example. Simply enough, each army was not given enough for basic operations and that alone as Patton was told. Instead, Eisenhower sent supplies off to Monty's disastrous Market Garden fiasco. The irony is hard not to see. Ike had taken Patton's supplies and given them to his most conservative general for a concentrated thrust. Sadly, Ike had chosen the wrong thrust, and it cost thousands of lives. The decision is particularly inexplicable, considering that Patton had proven what he was capable of doing.
Much is made along the lines of Ike "saving" Patton but it was usually the other way around. Ike had to deflate the unfavorable press accounts of Patton once it became clear that his superiors in Washington wanted him to remain. Patton's skill on the battlefield allowed Ike to claim that breakouts were part of the plan all along, even though such was not the case. The incidents were often so trivial and insignificant that they never should have called into question Patton's right to command. "The more difficult course would have been to come forward immediately and explain to the press and the American people why both incidents had been misinterpreted and blown way out of proportion--and why such vigor and brazenness that Patton had previously displayed was invaluable in leading an American army against the Nazi."* Once Eisenhower sensed the support of his superiors, of Roosevelt, Marshall, Stimpson, he would belatedly step forward and claimed Patton invaluable.
Montgomery made some equally noisy statements in the aftermath of the Bastogne, to the effect that he had saved the Americans, and during the speech one would get the impression that the word "colonists" could be substituted for "Americans". It was too much even for some of the British. Churchill publicly repudiated Montgomery when speaking before the house of commons. And yet, this led to no action from Eisenhower, and no calls for Montgomery's head or removal in shame. Simply enough, Patton came under some undeserved heat, which had its origins in the politics of the high command.
That was not the only instance when a distinct double standard could be seen. For instance, take these examples, in Patton's words:
It is noteworthy that had I done what Coningham did, I would have been relieved. Ike told me later that he could not punish Coningham [for calling the Americans cowards] because he was a New Zealander and political reasons forbade it. Unfortunately, I am neither a Democrat nor a Republican--just a soldier.
Lt. General Cocran, the s.o.b., publicly called our troops cowards. Ike says that since they were serving in his corps, that was O.K. I told him that had I so spoken of the British under me, my head would have come off. He agreed, but does nothing to Cocran.
In summary, even though Patton had started farthest from Germany in the beginning of the month of August, by then end he was 100 miles nearer than any other allied force. The Germans understood how dangerous he truly was:
The greatest threat . . . was the whereabouts of the feared U.S. Third Army. General Patton is always the main topic of military discussion. Where is he? When will he attack? Where . . . ? How? With what? Those are the questions which raced through the head of every German general since the famous German counteroffensive last December. . . . General Patton is the most feared General on all fronts. The successes of the U.S. Third Army are still overshadowing all the other events of the war, including the campaign in Russia . . . The tactics of General Patton are daring and unpredictable. He is the most modern general and the best commander of armored and infantry troops combined. (298)*
He understood the best way to defeat the Germans, and the Germans feared him for it. They could deal with the static, methodical front, but not with Patton piercing it and racing into Germany.
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*The Soul of Battle, by Victor Davis Hanson
**The Unknown Patton, by Charles Province
Alleged "Republican" (in name only) Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska is wringing his hands again. Never really a supporter of George Bush or the war in Iraq, Hagel has been preaching doom and gloom at every turn and to anyone who will listen. As a matter of fact, he sounds just like a Democrat. Let's take a look at his latest proclamations, shall we?